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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the trust is a relatively new phenomenon in Quebec. Although some form of a 
trust was provided for in the 19th century, this civil law version was extremely limited in its 
operation and posed a number of significant theoretical problems that were never clearly 
resolved. Foremost among these was the fact that the common law’s distinction between 
equitable and legal ownership did not sit well with the civil law notion of absolute ownership. 
The modern Code civil du Québec1 (CcQ) altered this situation with a dramatic reconfiguring 
of the law of trusts by creating a civil law version of the trust that not only addressed the 
theoretical problems but provided for a more versatile form of trust better suited to modern 
commercial and property law principles.
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE QUEBEC TRUST
As a civil law jurisdiction, Quebec had no specific provision for the creation of anything re-
sembling a common law trust. This is because the province’s civil code, the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada (CCLC),2 was based on the Coutume de Paris, a compilation of written rules 
regulating private transactions in force in the northern part of France in the early 16th cen-
tury.3 Two provisions in the 1866 CCLC did provide for trust-like devices, however. The first, 
art 869, allowed a testator to leave property to a fiduciary or trustee for charitable or religious 
purposes.4 The second was contained in art 964, and provided that where a bequest made for 
a specific person appeared to give title to a fiduciary, the fiduciary had an obligation to return 
the property to the estate of the grantor whenever the intended beneficiary was unable to 
receive the gift. The English version of the 1866 CCLC used the word “trustee,” but it seems 
1 CQLR c C-1991 [CcQ].
2 (1857-1866) [CCLC].
3 Jean-Louis Baudouin, “The Reform of the Civil Code of Québec: Objectives, Methodology and Imple-
mentation” (1983) 52:2 Rev jur UPR 149.
4 CCLC (1866), art 869a: “A testator may name legatees who shall be merely fiduciary or simply trustees 
for charitable or other lawful purposes within the limits permitted by law; he may also deliver over 
his property for the same objects to his testamentary executors, or effect such purposes by means of 
charges imposed upon his heirs or legatees.”
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clear that the term was not meant to incorporate common law concepts of trust into the 
CCLC. Instead, it was apparent that the transaction at issue was more akin to testamentary 
execution than any trust relationship.5
By 1879, however, pressure from influential lawyers in the province resulted in the passage 
of An Act Concerning the Trust,6 which contained certain provisions that appeared, on their 
face at least, to permit the creation of trusts that vaguely resembled those existing under 
English law. This statute was eventually incorporated into the Civil Code in 1888, but its pro-
visions created a great deal of confusion and conflict. One reason for this was that the im-
plications of this new Quebec trust were difficult to reconcile with the traditions of the civil 
law. Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars differed widely on its theoretical implications as well 
as the proper mode of interpreting its provisions. Some asserted that the trust created by the 
Civil Code was merely an extension of the various devices already known to the civil law, 
while others contended for a more vigorous interpretation, arguing that the 1879 legislation 
intended to create a trust in the English law tradition.
Most courts concluded that while the Quebec trust might operate to some extent like 
its common law cousin, it would not be governed by English law precedents.7 This meant 
that the Quebec trust functioned like its English counterpart in many cases, although the full 
scope and breadth of English trust law did not take hold. The result was that the Quebec trust 
remained a stunted version of the trust compared to the common law version.
The problem with the 1879 legislation was that, although it created a mechanism called a 
“trust,” the institution was quite limited in its usefulness. Under the terms of art 981a, the use 
of the old trust was confined to donative transfers by gift or will. This limitation made the trust 
far less useful than the common law version because it prevented the creation of commercial 
trusts as well as a wide range of trusts based on contract, such as asset protection trusts or 
trusts for co-ownership. The old Civil Code also prevented the use of a declaration of trust 
(a trust whereby the settlor declares himself to be trustee of property in his hands for the 
benefit of another) with the result that the sort of trust created in Paul v Constance8 could 
not arise.9 It also prohibited the creation of unit trusts, such as mutual fund trusts or real es-
tate investment trusts.10 Moreover, although the Civil Code provided for a form of charitable 
trust, such trusts were limited to those created by will. One could not create an inter vivos 
charitable trust.11 In addition, the definition of charitable purpose was more limited than that 
prevailing in common law, so that the civil law charitable trust was confined to a relatively 
narrow range of charitable activity.
5 CCLC (1866), art 964: “The legatee who is charged as a mere trustee, to administer the property and 
to employ it or deliver it over in accordance to the will, even though the terms used appear really 
to give him the quality of a proprietor subject to deliver over, rather than that of a mere executor or 
administrator, does not retain the property in the event of the lapse of the ulterior disposition, or of the 
impossibility of applying such property to the purposes intended, unless the testator has manifested 
his intention to that effect. The property in such cases passes to the heir or the legatee who receives 
the succession.”
6 SQ 1879, c 29.
7 See e.g. Curran v Davis, [1933] SCR 283, [1933] RCS 283; Laliberté v Larue, [1931] SCR 7, [1931] RCS 7; 
Laverdure v du Tremblay, [1937] CCS No 537, [1937] 2 DLR 561 (PC).
8 [1976] EWCA Civ 2, [1977] 1 WLR 527 (discussed in Chapter 4).
9 O’Meara v Bennett, [1921] CCS No 157, 61 DLR 241 (PC) (holding that a settlor’s declaration that shares 
in her hands were now held for the benefit of another was invalid under Quebec law).
10 See e.g. Crown Trust Co v Higher, [1977] 1 SCR 418, [1977] 1 RCS 418 (invalidating an attempt to create 
a real estate investment trust [REIT] on the grounds that Quebec law permits only trusts created by gift 
or will).
11 See CCLC, supra note 4 (limiting the creation of charitable trusts to “testators”).
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Without doubt, however, the most significant problem with the 1879 trust was the absence 
of any general framework to explain its nature and operation.12 That is to say, although the old 
Civil Code created an instrument that could function like a common law trust in many ways, 
some of the most important theoretical issues were unresolved by the statutory provisions. 
The result was a great deal of uncertainty about the scope and operation of the Quebec trust 
in ways that inhibited its growth and development, and, thus, its ultimate effectiveness as a 
device for the transfer and management of property.
One of the most important elements of this problem was where title to the trust prop-
erty would lie. Because the civil law rejects the common law distinction between legal and 
beneficial ownership, courts and commentators differed on the nature of the rights of the 
trustee and beneficiary with respect to the corpus of the trust. On its face, art 981a provided 
that a settlor may “convey” property to trustees. Yet there remained a great deal of ambigu-
ity in the clause. What was the legal effect of such a conveyance? Did it contemplate mere 
physical transfer with the right of management; or was a transfer of legal title envisioned? If 
the former, then who had the legal title? If the trustee was vested with title, then how could 
a beneficiary have any right to force a trustee to comply with the terms of the trust instru-
ment in the absence of any concept of beneficial ownership? The result was a great deal of 
academic gymnastics in an effort to find some theoretical basis for allocating rights between 
the various parties to the transaction. The Supreme Court attempted to clarify some of these 
questions in Royal Trust Co v Tucker,13 in which it held that the trustee held a “sui generis 
property right” in the trust assets, although not of a kind otherwise understood in either the 
civil or common law. The fact that this case arose in 1982 was an indication that, even after 
almost 100 years, the basic principles of the Quebec trust were still not well defined. As a 
result, following Tucker, calls for action to clarify and expand the role of the trust began to get 
louder. In time, the difficulties in precisely defining the nature of the institution of the Quebec 
trust, combined with the limitations on its use of the trust, convinced the National Assembly 
to undertake a revision of the trust in the context of the 1994 reform of the Civil Code.
The new Code civil du Québec, which came into force on January 1, 1994, introduced a 
concept of trust designed to create a more flexible vehicle than existed under the 1866 CCLC. 
It also provided a more coherent theoretical foundation for a trust in the civil law tradition. In 
effect, the drafters of the 1994 CcQ attempted to achieve three objectives. These included:
 1. defining the institution of the trust more clearly;
 2. resolving interpretation problems raised by the Civil Code of Lower Canada (1866); 
and
 3. broadening the scope of trusts to provide a more useful vehicle for private, commer-
cial, and public purposes.14
III. THE CONCEPT OF THE TRUST IN QUEBEC LAW
The new CcQ attempted to solve the first two problems by finding a juridical device that 
would mimic the tripartite relationship of the common law trust, but which would fit more 
comfortably within the basic principles of the civil law. It set out a general trust regime in 38 
articles within Book Four (Property) that provided a more explicit textual basis for the creation 
12 Jacques Beaulne, “The Law of Trusts” in Aline grenon & Louise Belanger-Hardy, eds, Elements of Que-
bec Civil Law: A Comparison with the Common Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2008) 169.
13 [1982] 1 SCR 250, 12 ETR 257.
14 Beaulne, supra note 12 at 175.
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and administration of trusts.15 The placement of the trust provisions in the property section of 
the CcQ had the effect of removing the trust from the constraints placed on it as a result of 
its former location in the part of the Code that dealt with wills. The trust is thus implicitly and 
explicitly not limited to situations of gifts and estate planning, but is to be available in a wider 
range of property transactions.
The CcQ also created a new legal regime for the administration of the property of others 
that codified for the first time standards for the conduct of administrators in handling prop-
erty.16 In so doing, the new CcQ resolved many of the theoretical and interpretive problems 
resulting from the rather bare-bones structure of the old Code. The new provisions were 
drafted in very general terms in order to provide more flexibility in their application and use. 
They are, in effect, default rules that leave parties free to define and implement trust rela-
tionships as they see fit. In addition, there are very few mandatory terms and few limitations 
arising from concerns of public order. Instead, the CcQ’s trust rules are “endowed with extra-
ordinary elasticity so that they may be applied as the norms of society evolve and change and 
thus be responsive to the demands of modern society and commerce.”17
The 1994 CcQ’s most important feature was its development of a coherent theoretical 
framework for the law of trusts in the context of Quebec’s civil law tradition. The trust cre-
ated under the 1866 CCLC did not fit well in Quebec law because the civil law lacks any real 
concept of legal and equitable ownership. Ownership of property in Quebec is absolute and 
indivisible. As a result, granting the trustee and the beneficiary distinct rights of ownership in 
the same property created a theoretical impossibility. The drafters of the 1994 CcQ solved 
this dilemma by adapting the civil law’s concept of “patrimony” (le patrimoine).
A. PATRIMONY
The principle of patrimony is unknown to the common law. It is generally defined as the 
whole of a person’s rights and obligations having a monetary value. Put another way, patri-
mony is “the total mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a person for 
the satisfaction of his economic needs.”18 The concept of patrimony is derived from Roman 
law, although it did not exist in French customary law prior to the 19th century. Its resurgence 
was largely due to the work of the continental jurists Charles Aubry and Frédéric Charles Rau, 
whose influential treatise, Cours de droit civil français (1839-46), inspired a reconsideration of 
the foundations of the civil law, especially with respect to the law of property.
According to Aubry and Rau, patrimony is inextricably connected to personality, and can 
be summed up in three rules:
 1. every natural person has a patrimony;
 2. every person has only one patrimony; and
 3. every patrimony belongs to a person.
This connection between patrimony and personality is reflected in art 2 of the CcQ, which 
declares that “[e]very person is the holder of a patrimony.”
In essence, the classical theory of patrimony states that every person has a patrimony that 
includes all of his economic rights and obligations. To be sure, the patrimony may be large or 
small, depending on one’s own economic circumstances. A child, a millionaire, and a pauper all 
15 CcQ, arts 1260-1298. See Marilyn Piccini Roy, “Trusts in Québec” in Alon Kaplan, ed, Trusts in Prime 
Jurisdictions (London: globe Law Business, 2010) 343 at 344-45 [Roy].
16 CcQ, arts 1299-1370.
17 Roy, supra note 15 at 345.
18 Creech v Capitol Mack, Inc, 287 So 2d 497 at 504 (La Sup Ct 1974).
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have a patrimony. The only question is what assets and obligations are comprised within it. In 
the case of a child, the answer is likely very little, while that of the millionaire will be extensive. 
Article 302 also notes that a person has “extra-patrimonial rights,” such as political or dignity 
rights—for example, the right to vote or the right to be free from unlawful discrimination—that 
are not encompassed within the patrimony itself. Further, a patrimony is indivisible; it cannot 
be separated from its holder, although a person may transfer certain rights and obligations to 
others. Finally, it is a fundamental rule that where there is no person, there is no patrimony. That 
is to say, a patrimony cannot exist independent of a connection to a natural person.
It is this theory of patrimony that has made the common law concept of trust problematic 
for civil law theorists. The dichotomy between equitable and legal ownership permitted in 
English law violates the fundamental principle that patrimony cannot exist independently of a 
natural person. The drafters of Quebec’s CcQ resolved the conceptual difficulties generated 
by the strict theory of patrimony by creating multiple forms of patrimony, which do not in-
volve absolute ownership by an individual:
302. Every legal person has a patrimony which may, to the extent provided by law, be 
divided or appropriated to a purpose. It also has the extra-patrimonial rights and obliga-
tions flowing from its nature.
The ability to “divide” or “appropriate” a patrimony results in the creation of three different 
kinds of patrimony in Quebec. These might be termed the general patrimony, the patrimony 
of division, and the patrimony by appropriation. The general patrimony is largely akin to that 
of the classical theory of patrimony, and includes the patrimony of natural persons.19 A patri-
mony of division is seen in the context of a family patrimony, where married persons share 
ownership of marital assets.20 The patrimony by appropriation allows for the creation of a 
patrimony that is appropriated to a specific purpose without being attached to any particu-
lar natural person. The result is that Quebec law has moved rather substantially away from 
Aubry and Rau’s classical theory of “no patrimony without a person” to one that recognizes 
the possibility that not all patrimonies may be attached to a person. As it stands now, then, 
although every person has a patrimony, not every patrimony is attached to a person.
B. PATRIMONY BY APPROPRIATION
The patrimony by appropriation (le patrimoine d’affectation) is the foundation of the Quebec 
trust. It is derived from the work of the French jurist Pierre Le Paulle, who was fascinated by 
the workings of the common law trust and sought some way of incorporating the trust into 
civil law theory. He argued for an “obligation model” of trust that focused on the trust as an 
obligation imposed on the trustee to manage the property of a third party. This obligation is 
a personal one between the settlor and the trustee. This formulation avoided the difficulties 
inherent in trying to graft the equitable dichotomy of ownership into the civil law. It also 
avoided having to consider the trust as a separate legal person, a solution that would do dam-
age to the fundamental concept of patrimony. In 2014, the Court said in Yarod v Yarod that 
the concept of a patrimony without a holder was thus introduced “in an effort to adapt the 
common law trust to the framework of civil law.”21
The key to understanding the patrimony by appropriation is to remember that a Quebec 
trust is not a legal person or separate entity.22 Neither is it property held by the trustee. Instead, 
19 CcQ, art 2.
20 CcQ, arts 414-417.
21 Yarod v Yarod, 2019 SCC 62, 440 DLR (4th) 197 at para. 17.
22 It should be noted that, although the common law trust is not based on the Quebec trust concept of 
patrimony by appropriation, the trustee in a common law trust is a legal person but the trust itself is 
not a separate legal entity.
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the CcQ envisions the trust property as “an autonomous patrimony distinct from all the ac-
tors—the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiary—and in which none of them have a real right, 
in the sense of a right in the property itself.”23 Unlike the common law trustee, the trustee of a 
Quebec trust has no right of ownership. Instead, the relationship between the trust patrimony 
and the trustee is one of powers. The trustee has power to administer the property on behalf 
of the settlor,24 but neither the trustee nor the settlor has legal title. The settlor’s ownership 
rights cease the moment the property is appropriated, and the trustee’s obligations begin the 
moment he takes custody. Moreover, because no one has legal title, the trustee, as administra-
tor of the appropriated property, has the exclusive right to control and administer it.25
Because the theory of the Quebec trust does not depend on legal or equitable ownership, 
there is no requirement that the settlor actually convey the property to the trustee. Instead, 
the settlor appropriates the property to the patrimony.26 The trust is made effective when the 
trustee accepts the powers and obligations.27 The consequence of this is that the foundations 
of Quebec trust law are on a different footing than the common law trust. Because the law 
governing the Quebec trust is primarily concerned with the respective powers and obliga-
tions of the trustee, trust law is less the law of property and more the law of obligations.
Undoubtedly, the concept of a patrimony by appropriation is a difficult concept for com-
mon lawyers to understand, but its advantage is that it fits far more neatly into the structure of 
civil law theory. One commentator has attempted to justify the divergence in theory by noting 
that the concept of patrimony is “no less a magnum mysterium for the common lawyer than 
is the duality of legal and equitable title for the civil lawyer.”28 Nonetheless, although common 
lawyers may be somewhat wary of the nuances of patrimony by appropriation, the Quebec 
trust evidences most of the essential features of the common law trust. These include:
 1. a triangular relationship between settlor, trustee, and beneficiary;29
 2. a trustee to administer the trust assets;
 3. dedication of the assets to a particular purpose (either personal or public); and
 4. supervision of the trustee by the courts to ensure the performance of obligations.
As a result, although the Quebec trust rests on a fundamentally different legal theory, it has 
largely achieved a functional equivalence with the common law trust. In addition, in certain 
important respects described below, such as the case of the non-charitable purpose trust, 
the Quebec trust may actually be a more effective vehicle for achieving certain purposes.
23 Roy, supra note 15 at 346.
24 In contrast, the trustee of a common law trust administers the property subject to the trust according 
to the terms of the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries or to pursue the purposes of the trust. The 
common law trustee does not manage the property on behalf of the settlor. The reason for the differ-
ent approach in the Quebec trust is expanded on in Section VI below.
25 Yared v Yared, supra note 21 at para 17.
26 CcQ, art 1260.
27 CcQ, art 1261.
28 John EC Brierley, “The New Québec Law of Trusts: The Adaptation of Common Law Thought to Civil 
Law Concepts” in H Patrick glenn, ed, Droit Québécois et droit français: communauté, autonomie, 
concordance (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 1993) 383 at 392.
29 The nature of this tripartite relationship in the context of the Quebec trust is explained more fully in 
Section VI.A below. In a common law trust created by the transfer of property to another as trustee, 
unless the settlor has reserved rights or powers, the settlor no longer has rights or powers with re-
spect to the property. Such a common law trust settlor is part of a tripartite relationship only to the 
extent that the settlor creates the trust and thereby creates the trust relationship between the trustee 
and beneficiaries.
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IV. FORMATION OF THE TRUST
It should be clear that the institution of the trust in Quebec law is exclusively a matter of stat-
ute. As a result, the rules for creation, administration, and termination of a trust are set forth in 
the CcQ, which provides for all its essential elements.
With respect to formation, art 1260 provides the fundamental rule for the creation of a 
Quebec trust:
1260. A trust results from an act whereby a person, the settlor, transfers property from 
his patrimony to another patrimony constituted by him which he appropriates to a particu-
lar purpose and which a trustee undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer.
Article 1260 provides that the formation of a valid trust requires four factors. There must 
be (1) an act whereby a settlor, (2) transfers property from his patrimony to another patrimony 
constituted by him, (3) which he appropriates to a particular purpose, and (4) which a trustee 
undertakes, by his acceptance, to hold and administer. Without these four elements, there 
can be no trust.30
It is important to note that art 1260 does not say that a trust is “created.” Instead, it says 
that a trust “results” (résulte) when these four elements are satisfied. Thus, a settlor does not 
necessarily have to formally desire the creation of a trust. On the contrary, a trust may arise 
simply because the settlor has acted in a particular way. Although courts and practitioners will 
frequently use the English word “create,” the CcQ seems to deliberately avoid using the term. 
This is because the civil law trust is not to be considered a thing (une chose) or an entity that 
is created by a single event. Rather, it is more properly viewed as a relationship involving three 
parties. It is in fact “rather like a marriage, a domicile, or a filiation, all of which also result, but 
which are not created or creations.”31
A. AN “ACT”
Article 1260 does not define the “act” necessary for the formation of a trust. Instead, that work 
is done by art 1262:
1262. A trust is established by contract, whether by onerous or gratuitous title, by will or, 
in certain cases, by law. Where authorized by law, it may also be established by judgment.
This article makes it clear that there are, in general, four “acts” that satisfy the first re-
quirement of art 1260, and which may result in the formation of a trust. These include (1) a 
contract, (2) a will, (3) a judgment, or (4) a statute.
1. A Contract
The CcQ defines a contract as simply “an agreement of wills, by which one or several persons 
obligate themselves to one or several other persons.”32 The type of contract envisaged in the 
trust context is one that is either “onerous or gratuitous,” which in common law terms might 
30 Jacques Beaulne asserts that, in effect, CcQ art 1260 requires all trusts, no matter how they are con-
stituted, to have four key elements, namely: the constitution of a patrimony, the transfer of property to 
this distinct patrimony by the settlor, the acceptance and administration of this property by the trustee, 
and, finally, the appropriation of this transferred patrimony for a particular purpose permitted by law. 
Jacques Beaulne, “Les éléments constitutifs de la fiducie” in Droit des fiducies, 3rd ed (Chambly, Que: 
Wilson & Lafleur, 2015) at 1-12.
31 John B Claxton, Studies on the Quebec Law of Trust (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 56.
32 CcQ, art 1378.
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be defined as a contract with or without consideration. An onerous contract is probably the 
most common means of establishing a trust apart from a will. This is because most inter vivos 
transfers of property to trustees are done by means of an onerous contract. The CcQ defines 
an onerous contract as one wherein “each party obtains an advantage in return for his obli-
gation.”33 The onerous nature of the agreement basically centres on the economic advantage 
gained by each of the parties. On the one hand, the settlor will gain the management and 
administration of the property by someone else. The trustee, on the other hand, will usually 
obtain some form of remuneration for services. Common examples of such exchanges can 
be found in the investment trust or the real estate investment trust.
The CcQ defines a gratuitous contract as one wherein “one party obligates himself to the 
other for the benefit of the latter without obtaining any advantage in return.”34 As noted above, 
the question of whether a contract is onerous or gratuitous depends on the extent to which 
economic advantages flow between the parties. In the context of the Quebec trust, a gratuit-
ous contract is one in which the trustee agrees to perform services on behalf of the settlor 
without receiving any remuneration or other benefit. There is often some confusion about 
this point. As will be seen below, one classification of the Quebec trust is a “personal trust” 
which is “constituted gratuitously for the purpose of securing a benefit” to an individual.35 
On occasion, some have asserted that this gratuitous trust must be the result of a gratuitous 
contract. That is not the case, however. The contract described in art 1262 is that which exists 
between the settlor and the trustee, and has nothing to do with whether the beneficiary 
receives a gratuitous benefit. Thus, a so-called gratuitous trust may be formed as the result of 
an onerous contract, as where a trust company is paid to administer a private trust on behalf 
of the settlor, or by a gratuitous contract, wherein a family member undertakes to perform 
the role of trustee for the benefit of the settlor’s minor children. Put another way, a gratuitous 
trust may be the result of either an onerous or gratuitous contract.
The precise form of the contract required for the establishment of a trust is not set out 
in the CcQ, and thus no particular formalities are required. So, for example, in the case of a 
private trust, which would include most commercial trusts, the contract need not even be in 
writing. Moreover, subject to the rules of evidence, a contract might even be implied by the 
conduct of the parties. As is the case with common law trusts, however, certain formalities 
may be required where particular property, such as land or “immovables,” are concerned.36
2. A Will
As was true of the 1866 CCLC, the CcQ continues the practice of allowing the formation of 
trusts by will. The form of the will must comply with the provisions of arts 712-730.1. Failure to 
do so results in the will, and any trust constituted under it, being declared a “nullity.”37 Quebec 
permits three different forms of wills. These include the “notarial will” (a will executed by a 
notary en minute), the holograph will, and the will executed by the testator in the presence 
of witnesses.38 The notarial will does not exist in the common law jurisdictions, although both 
the holograph will and the will executed by the testator are well-known features of the law of 
successions and estates in the common law provinces.
33 CcQ, art 1381.
34 Ibid.
35 CcQ, art 1267.
36 See e.g. CcQ, art 2938  (requiring “publication” of the “acquisition, creation, recognition, modification, 
transmission or extinction of an immovable real right”).
37 CcQ, art 713.
38 CcQ, arts 712, 716, 726, 727.
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3. A Judgment
Article 1262 states that a trust may be established by judgment “where authorized by law.” 
It seems clear that this article refers primarily to statutory trusts, and not to constructive or 
resulting trusts. It is generally agreed that the part of the article permitting trusts to be “estab-
lished by judgment” is dependent on previous “authorization by law”—which is to say, author-
ized by a specific statute. Consequently, courts have the power to create a trust only where 
specifically provided by another article of the CcQ or a separate statute. An example of a 
trust established “by law” is found in art 591, which authorizes a court in a domestic relations 
matter to “order the constitution of a trust” to ensure the payment of support to a spouse or 
minor children. An example of such a trust is found in T(S) v L(M),39 in which the Court entered 
a judgment wherein the wife, who owed money to the husband as a result of a property 
settlement, was declared trustee of the sums owed by her to guarantee payment of the hus-
band’s spousal and child support obligations. The order essentially kept the wife’s obligation 
in trust so as to secure the husband’s support payments.
4. A Statute
The inclusion of a provision permitting trusts to be established “by law” was done in order to 
provide a means by which certain funds and arrangements might have the characteristics of 
trusts even though, in some cases, there is no actual settlor or no express declaration of a 
trust. An example of statutory trusts is found in the Supplemental Pension Plans Act,40 which 
provides that a pension fund shall constitute a trust patrimony and that the “pension com-
mittee shall act in the capacity of trustee.” An example of a statutory trust where there is no 
settlor is found in the Quebec Election Act,41 which provides that every candidate for election 
have a registered official agent whose job it is to hold and account for funds received by the 
campaign, and report their use to the candidate, the chief electoral officer, and the public. Al-
though the Act does not specifically say so, it seems clear that the official agent is a trustee.42
B. TRANSFER OF PROPERTY
As with common law trusts, there can be no Quebec trust in the absence of a transfer of 
property. This transfer must be from the patrimony of the settlor to another patrimony “con-
stituted by him.”
1. A Transfer
Article 1260 uses the word, “transfer” (transfère) to indicate that the act establishing the trust 
must result in an alienation of the settlor’s rights in the property or of a legally recognized 
right that is itself considered a property interest, such as a right to payment or an intellectual 
property right. The transfer of “real” rights—that is, rights in existing things or land—is effective 
at the moment that the contract is made, regardless of whether there is an actual delivery of 
the property at the time.43 A transfer of a “personal” right, which is to say a right to receive 
payment, the performance of a service, or the use or lease of an object, is also accomplished 
39 [1995] JQ No 1570 (QL), [1995] RDF 677 (Sup Ct).
40 CQLR c R-15.1.
41 CQLR c E-3.3.
42 Ibid, ss 408 et seq.
43 CcQ, art  1453.
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by consent, but the transfer is not effective until the person from whom the obligation is 
due has received notice of the transfer.44 Note, however, that third parties with an interest in 
the property or right will only be bound by a transfer if the formalities of notice and, in some 
cases, publication or registration are met.45 Thus, a transfer of land or goods subject to a 
security interest will require notice to lienholders and publication in the appropriate registry.
The transfer of title envisioned by art 1260 is rather different than that for a common law 
trust. Rather than a transfer of legal title from settlor to trustee, the Quebec trust does not 
result in title being vested in the trustee. There is not, in other words, a “translative” transfer 
of title in which ownership passes from settlor to trustee. Instead, there is a transfer from the 
general patrimony of the settlor to another patrimony established by him. The patrimony of 
the trust is independent of both settlor and trustee so that there is no actual ownership by the 
trustee. Upon acceptance, the trustee assumes duties and powers with respect to the trust 
property, but the trustee is not the owner.
2. Of Property
As with the common law trust, almost any kind of property may be transferred to a Quebec 
trust. This includes property that is movable, immovable, corporeal, or incorporeal, including 
rights that are vested but not yet possessory. In addition, any right that may be considered a 
form of property may also be transferred.
The civil law recognizes the term “property” (biens) to comprise both goods (meubles) 
and land (immeubles). Within the category of movable goods are things (choses) and rights 
(droits) that have economic value. The use of the word “things” is restricted to tangible ob-
jects, while the term “rights” is used to refer to intangibles. In civil law terms, a right is anything 
that gives a cause of action in law that may result in economic gain. A right is derived from a 
thing, but it is not a right to the thing itself. Thus, the term “property” encompasses all forms 
of property—real, chattel, and intangible.
The civil law divides property rights into two general categories: real rights and per-
sonal rights.
Real rights include property interests in an object or thing. The right is an avoir, a thing that 
may be acquired from another. The common law traditionally referred to such rights as rights 
in rem. Real rights may only attach to things that are certain and in existence. Where the 
property may be in existence but not yet identified, there is no real right. Thus, a contract for 
“100 tonnes of coal” conveys no real right in the coal until it is actually set aside and identified 
to the contract. Until then, the right is merely a personal right against the other party.
Personal rights are those that involve the payment of a debt or performance of a service. 
These rights are not claims against a thing—that is, rights in rem—but rather rights against a 
debtor, a créance. At the same time, however, a personal right, or créance, may be acquired 
or transferred and so may also be considered an avoir. Thus, the right to receive a payment of 
money on a debt is a créance that may form the corpus of a trust.
Intellectual property rights were not originally considered to be a form of property, an 
avoir, because they were neither things, rights in things, nor rights against a person. Instead, 
an intellectual property right was thought to be a creation, an être. The modern view, how-
ever, is that such rights are forms of property, perhaps falling into the category of incorpor-
eal movables.
In sum, as with the common law, the CcQ recognizes a wide variety of objects that might 
become property of a trust. The main difficulty lies in the civil law’s rather obscure and 
non-obvious (at least for common lawyers) use of terms to describe the different categories 
44 CcQ, arts  1637, 1641.
45 CcQ, art  1642.
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of property. These include “corporeal immovables” (“land, and any constructions and works 
of a permanent nature located thereon”);46 “incorporeal immovables” (rights in immovables, 
such as the right of possession, or uses and servitudes);47 “corporeal movables” (things which 
can be moved, as well as any property not specifically categorized by the CcQ);48 and “incor-
poreal movables” (for example, shares of stock, payment on a debt, or intellectual property 
rights)49—all terms that describe rights known to the common law, but which are alien to the 
common law lexicon.
3. From His Patrimony to Another Patrimony
The strict wording of art 1260 implies that a trust exists only where a settlor transfers property 
“from his patrimony.” On the face of it, this wording would mean that no trust could arise 
unless the settlor transfers some property of his own to the trust. However, scholars who have 
considered this question have concluded that this strict reading could not have been intended 
by the legislature. There are many examples where such a reading would work a nonsense. 
Imagine, for example, a case wherein an organization established a fund to accomplish a par-
ticular purpose and authorized the treasurer to receive funds for that purpose. The treasurer 
might open a trust account and receive contributions from members. Yet if the organization 
itself failed to make its own contribution, could it really be the case that there was no trust and 
that the moneys received would not be held in trust? Or consider the case wherein an invest-
ment manager creates an investment fund and solicits investments. If the manager himself 
does not put any money in, can it really be that there is no commercial trust? It seems the an-
swers must be in the negative because it cannot be that the legislature intended to “impose a 
formalism that would frustrate” basic forms of the trust.50 Therefore, the words “from his patri-
mony” in art 1260 must be taken to mean “from his patrimony or the patrimony of another.”
C. WHICH HE APPROPRIATES TO A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
The term “appropriation” may have several meanings in English. However, as used in the CcQ, 
the French version of the term, “affecté,” may be best translated as “assigned.” Thus the term 
“appropriate” implies the “dedication of property to a particular end or purpose” (determina-
tion d’une finalité particulière en vue de laquelle un bien sera utilisé).51
Obviously, an express dedication of the property serves the purpose of art 1260. However, 
particular words or forms are not required. Instead, it is enough that there be some expres-
sion of an intention to create a separate patrimony and to transfer property to it. It also seems 
clear that a trust may be implied by the circumstances. Although it is always preferable for a 
settlor to use words such as “in trust for” or “upon a trust” or “which I appropriate,” the exact 
wording is not determinative. In cases where trusts are established by onerous or gratuitous 
contract, the general rules of contract interpretation apply. Similarly, the rules for interpreting 
a testator’s intent apply where a trust is established by will.52 In any event, the intention to 
46 CcQ, art 900.
47 CcQ, arts 904, 1119.
48 CcQ, arts 905, 907.
49 CcQ, art 909.
50 Claxton, supra note 31 at 60.
51 gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1987) sub verbo “affecté.”
52 See e.g. Trust Général du Canada v Poitras, [1998] JQ No 3321 (QL), JE 99-30 (Sup Ct) (holding that a 
will established a trust even though the word “trust” was not used because there was a clear intention 
to establish a separate patrimony); Roy, succession (Re), [1995] JQ No 2266 (QL), JE 95-1856 (Sup Ct) 
(a bequest of 10 percent of an estate to “les oeuvres de charité” was effective to establish a trust).
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establish a separate patrimony must be clear from the words and circumstances. Where there 
is ambiguity, there can be no trust.
To what may the patrimony be appropriated? The CcQ provides for three classes of trust. 
These include trusts for (1) personal, (2) private, or (3) social purposes. The next section con-
siders each of these purposes in turn. For the present, however, it is important to note that 
whatever form the trust takes, it must have a beneficiary. In that regard, the term “beneficiary” 
does not necessarily mean a particular person. A trust may be constituted for a purpose or a 
benefit, although the beneficiary is not a party to the trust itself. Instead, a beneficiary may be 
a person determined or capable of being determined. Moreover, the object of the trust must 
be clearly defined. The objects may be wide or narrow, but it is essential that the purpose of 
the trust be set forth in the instrument establishing it. There are two reasons for this. First, the 
definition of the purpose will dictate the classification of the trust and how it will be treated 
under the CcQ. Second, Quebec law does not generally permit the modification of trusts 
except in very limited circumstances. As a result, although a form of the doctrine of cy près 
may be applicable to social trusts in Quebec, the power to modify personal or private trusts is 
severely limited. This aspect of the Quebec trust is examined below in Section V.
D. WHICH A TRUSTEE UNDERTAKES, BY HIS ACCEPTANCE, TO HOLD 
AND ADMINISTER
The final step in establishing a trust is acceptance by the trustee. This means that there must 
be a trustee who accepts the property before the trust can come into existence.53 The trustee 
may be either a natural person with full legal capacity or a qualified trust company.54 Accept-
ance by the trustee means acceptance of the office, not necessarily the property or owner-
ship of it.
The CcQ does not specify the precise form of acceptance. In some situations, the trustee 
may be a party to the act establishing the trust, but this is not a requirement. For example, the 
trustee is never a party to a will. Similarly, a trust established as part of a divorce settlement 
is frequently created by means of an onerous contract between the parties to the marriage. 
The contract will provide a means for nominating a trustee and delivering the property, but 
an actual trustee may not be named. On the other hand, a trustee may be part of an oner-
ous contract establishing a commercial trust. Frequently, the trustee’s acceptance may be 
inferred by certain acts taken in respect of the management of the property that is the subject 
of the trust.
Article 1265 provides a further explanation of the process by which a trust is established. 
It declares:
1265. Acceptance of the trust divests the settlor of the property, charges the trustee 
with seeing to the appropriation of the property and the administration of the trust patri-
mony and is sufficient to establish the right of the beneficiary with certainty.
Acceptance by the trustee thus has three significant consequences: (1) it divests the settlor 
of the property, (2) it charges the trustee with the obligation to manage the estate, and (3) it 
establishes the right of the beneficiary.
1. Acceptance of the Trust Divests the Settlor of the Property
Upon acceptance of the trust by the trustee, the settlor is divested of the property and title 
passes. Yet it is important to note that title does not pass to the patrimony because, as noted 
53 CcQ, art 1264.
54 CcQ, arts 1274, 304. See also An Act Respecting Trust Companies and Savings Companies, CQLR c 
S-29.01.
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above, the patrimony is not a legal person. Nor is title vested in the trustee, because he has no 
real right in the property. Instead, as art 1278 makes clear, the title is made out in the trustee’s 
name, but only so that the trustee may exercise powers of administration and management.
1278. A trustee has the control and the exclusive administration of the trust patrimony, 
and the titles relating to the property of which it is composed are drawn up in his name; 
he has the exercise of all the rights pertaining to the patrimony and may take any proper 
measure to secure its appropriation.
2. Acceptance of the Trust Charges the Trustee with Appropriation 
and Administration
Acceptance by the trustee vests the trustee with the obligation to both appropriate the prop-
erty and then manage it. In general terms, this means that the trustee is now charged with 
the duty to obtain delivery of the property, although physical delivery is not always possible 
or desirable. In some cases, the trustee may only be able to take legal title, while physical 
possession remains elsewhere.
In addition, once there has been a physical or constructive delivery, the trustee is obligated 
to preserve and manage the property in accordance with the terms of the trust. This is where 
the provisions of Title Seven of Book Four come into play. As discussed earlier, the theory of 
the civil law trust is that the trustee is not the owner, as is the case in common law, but is, 
rather, charged with the obligation to manage property belonging to others. The trustee’s 
duties are therefore similar to those of any person or entity responsible for holding the prop-
erty of third parties. Thus, the innovation of the CcQ over the former CCLC is that it solves 
the theoretical problem posed by the civil law’s rejection of the law and equity dichotomy by 
means of the patrimony by affectation (patrimoine affecté) found in Title Six of Book Four 
and the rules for administering the property of others in Title Seven. The trustee’s duties arise 
as a result of this second aspect of the trust. Title Seven provides an extensive set of rules 
for determining how property is to be managed, the obligations of the administrator toward 
beneficiaries and third parties, the duty to provide accounts, and the procedures required for 
termination of the relationship.
3. Acceptance of the Trust Establishes the Right of the Beneficiary
Acceptance by the trustee also triggers certain rights and obligations with respect to the 
beneficiary. In the first place, the trustee’s acceptance imposes on him the duty to act in 
accordance of the terms of the trust. In addition, acceptance “establish[es] the right of the 
beneficiary with certainty.”55 This means that the beneficiary is now empowered to enforce 
the trustee’s obligations and duties.56 It also means that the trust has become irrevocable.
V. CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE QUEBEC TRUST
As noted above, the CCLC recognized a limited variety of trusts relative to the common law. 
Trusts for persons could be created only by will or donation, which meant that it was largely 
impossible to create a commercial trust. And while something in the nature of a charitable 
trust might be created, the Quebec form had little similarity to the common law charitable 
55 CcQ, art 1265.
56 CcQ, art 1284.
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trust, so much so that it was sui generis.57 Moreover, it could be created only by will, a fact 
that severely limited its usefulness for modern purposes.58
The CcQ creates a threefold classification of trusts, although there remains a great deal 
of difficulty in determining into which category a particular trust will fall. This is because the 
Code classifies trusts based on three factors: (1) the way in which a trust is created—that is, by 
will or by contract; (2) the legal source of creation—that is, whether by contract, will, statute 
or judgment; and (3) the purpose for which a trust is established. The first two methods of 
categorization are of limited interest on a practical level, although legal theorists find dis-
cussion of these categories useful. The most practical and logical method of categorization 
centres on the third category—purpose.
In Quebec, trusts fall into three main categories based on their purpose: (1) personal, 
(2) private, and (3) social.59 It is somewhat strange that the CcQ does not actually provide 
a definition of each of the trust forms; it merely gives examples of each. This is perhaps to 
provide some flexibility as to form. Settlors are given the freedom to structure the terms of 
the trust as long as the final product complies with the type of trust envisioned by the Code.
A. PERSONAL TRUSTS
Article 1267 provides that a personal trust “is constituted gratuitously for the purpose of 
securing a benefit for a determinate or determinable person.” The closest analogue at com-
mon law is what is familiarly known as a “family trust,” which is to say a trust designed to 
provide income or support to family members. A personal trust is, not surprisingly, a trust 
designed for personal purposes. The personal trust can be created by will or by an inter vivos 
transfer. Examples include testamentary trusts, wherein the deceased might transfer capital 
to a trust, with the income to be used to support a surviving spouse; upon the death of the 
spouse, the capital would be distributed to the children or grandchildren. Another example 
might be a trust, established by either will or contract, whereby a fund is established by the 
settlor to provide care for a minor child or an aging relative. Still another example might be an 
inter vivos trust in which a settlor seeks to transfer capital as a gift to take advantage of certain 
tax deductions or exclusions.
1. Method of Creation
A personal trust is established to provide a gratuitous benefit. It is, in common law terms, a 
“donative” trust. Bear in mind, however, that it is the benefit that is gratuitous, not necessarily 
its making. In other words, a personal trust may be established by an onerous contract—that 
is, a contract involving consideration; the contract establishing the trust may be onerous, 
as in a contract by which a trust company agrees to manage a fund for a beneficiary and 
receive payment. There was some early commentary in the academic and legal community 
to the effect that a gratuitous trust had to be established gratuitously, either by will or by a 
notarial deed, but that seems to be a minority opinion today. The more modern view is that 
the personal trust is a new “liberality,” or new form of gift specifically provided for in the text 
of the CcQ.60
The beneficiary of a personal trust may be a natural or legal person, including a corporation.
57 See Royal Trust Co v Tucker, supra note 13.
58 CCLC, art 869.
59 CcQ, art 1266.
60 See e.g. John EC Brierley, “The gratuitous Trust: A New Liberality in Québec Law” in Mélanges Paul-
André Crépeau (Cowansville, Que: Yvon Blais, 1997) 119; Claxton, supra note 31 at 78-80.
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2. Duration
The personal trust is the only trust that is limited in its duration. It is limited by three factors. 
First, it may provide for only two “ranks” of income beneficiary before distribution to the cap-
ital beneficiary. Second, the rights of the first rank must open within 100 years after the trust is 
constituted. Third, no person may enjoy the benefits for more than 100 years.
1271. A personal trust constituted for the benefit of several persons successively may 
not include more than two ranks of beneficiaries of the fruits and revenues, in addition to 
that of the beneficiary of the capital; it is without effect with respect to any subsequent 
ranks it might contemplate.
1272. The right of beneficiaries of the first rank opens not later than 100 years after the 
trust is constituted, even if a longer term is stipulated. The right of beneficiaries of subse-
quent ranks may open later but solely for the benefit of those beneficiaries who have the 
required quality to receive at the expiry of 100 years after the constitution of the trust.
In no case may a legal person be a beneficiary for a period exceeding 100 years, even if 
a longer term is stipulated.
Article 1271 makes clear that only two ranks of beneficiaries may enjoy the fruits of the 
trust before distribution to the capital beneficiary. If the trust instrument provides for more 
than two ranks, it is still valid, but it is “without effect” as to the later beneficiaries. The corpus 
of the trust must be distributed to the next rank.61
Article 1272 provides that the right of the first rank must open within 100 years after the 
trust is constituted. Moreover, the right of subsequent ranks to inherit must be effective by 
the end of that 100-year period. Thus, within the 100-year period, the first rank must take. The 
second rank must also be able to take—that is, they must be qualified beneficiaries in exist-
ence, but they may not actually be able to take if the first rank has not yet been extinguished.
The use of the word “rank” is meant to apply to levels of beneficiaries, not necessarily to 
relationship or degree of kinship. For example, a brother might be in the first rank and a sister 
in the second. They may be of the same degree of kinship, but they are of different rank as 
beneficiaries of the trust.
Finally, no beneficiary may enjoy the benefits of the trust for more than 100 years. This term 
is perhaps meant to represent the absolute maximum length of a modern life. It also includes 
corporations, with the result that a personal trust is prevented from becoming perpetual.
In effect, arts 1271 and 1272 operate as a version of the rule against perpetuities. They are 
designed to prevent a settlor from tying up property for successive generations. The settlor 
may encumber property only to the level of his grandchildren before it must be distributed.
B. PRIVATE TRUSTS
Private trusts have a private or community purpose that is not itself designed to provide a per-
sonal benefit to an individual. They may be perpetual. Private trusts come in two forms: (1) the 
private purpose trust and (2) the onerous private trust. In effect, private trusts have either a 
commercial or non-commercial purpose.
1. Private Purpose (Non-Commercial) Trusts
The private purpose trust is designed to allow for the erection, maintenance, or preservation 
of a thing or to use property for a specific use or end.
61 Amyot (Succession de), JE 99-828, REJB 1999-12060 (Que CS), rev’d on other grounds Amyot (Suc-
cession de) c Amyot, REJB 2001-24796 (Que CA).
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1268. A private trust has for its object the erection, maintenance or preservation of a 
thing or the use of property appropriated to a specific use, whether for the indirect benefit 
of a person or in his memory, or for some other private purpose.
A close reading of this article reveals that there are, in fact, two different kinds of 
non-commercial trusts. The first involves a trust for erecting, maintaining, or preserving a thing. 
The second encompasses setting aside a fund or property “appropriated to a specific use.”
The most common example of the first sort would be a trust for the erection of a monu-
ment, such as a war memorial, or the maintenance of a tomb or burial ground. Other ex-
amples might include trusts for the preservation of a heritage site or an historic property. 
A modern example might be the creation of an environmental trust, whereby funds are set 
aside to establish a wildlife refuge.62 These might be akin to the “anomalous trust for pur-
poses” referred to in Re Endacott,63 wherein Lord Evershed countenanced trusts for the care 
of animals or the erection of tombs and monuments only on the ground that they had been 
tolerated by earlier cases.64
The second type of private non-commercial trust is akin to a Quistclose trust65 or Den-
ley’s trust.66 In discussing the proposed article on non-commercial trusts in the CcQ, the 
Commentaires du ministre, published contemporaneously with the Code revisions in 1993, 
gave examples of the types of trusts that would be permitted under the new Code. These 
examples bear a close relation to the anomalous common law non-charitable trusts. Thus 
the Commentaires described “a fund for the purchase of medicines, medical devices, wheel-
chairs, etc.” (“une somme destinée à l’achat de médicaments, d’appareils medicaux, fauteuil 
roulant etc.”) for employees of a company or “a property set aside to provide a holiday retreat 
for a firm’s employees” (“un immeuble destine à server de lieu de villégiature aux salariés 
d’une entreprise”).67 Similarly, it appears that a trust to fund youth hockey leagues or maintain 
recreation grounds for residents of a particular town or employees of an enterprise are exam-
ples of permissible non-commercial trusts.
Finally, it is important to distinguish between private purpose trusts and outright gifts. A 
clause in a will providing for the purchase of an object without further instruction will not be a 
private trust. For example, a clause in a will providing for a sum of money to buy a new X-ray 
machine for the local hospital would not be a trust. Instead, it would be a conditional gift 
because the funds are transferred into the patrimony of the hospital, which is then under an 
obligation to use them for the stated purpose. To establish a private purpose trust, the donor 
would have to ensure that the clause provides for a transfer to a patrimony by appropriation.
a. Benefit
It is sometimes difficult to differentiate between personal and private trusts. After all, there is 
no doubt that private purpose trusts may benefit individuals. The caretaker of a historic site 
in a private purpose trust as well as the fund manager of a commercial trust certainly benefit 
from the establishment of the private trust. However, providing an income to either is not 
the fundamental purpose of the trust. To differentiate between the personal and private trust, 
62 See e.g. Rémi Moreau, La protection du milieu naturel par les fiducies foncières (Montreal: Wilson & 
Lafleur, 1995).
63 [1960] Ch 232.
64 See also Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts, [1952] 1 Ch 534, 1 All ER 1067.
65 See Barclays Bank Limited v Quistclose Investments Limited, [1979] AC 567, [1968] UKHL 4.
66 Re Denley’s Trust Deed, [1968] 3 All ER 65, [1969] 1 Ch 373 (Ch): see Chapter 5.
67 Quebec, Ministère de la justice, Commentaires du ministre de la justice, vol 1 (Quebec: Publications 
du Québec, 1993) at 754 [Commentaires du ministre].
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one must focus on the nature of the benefit conferred. In the personal trust, the benefit is 
intended to be conferred directly. The beneficiary receives funds or property directly from 
the trust in accordance with its terms. In the private, non-commercial trust, the benefit is 
conferred indirectly. More important, conferring a benefit on the specific individual is not the 
primary intent. Put another way, the beneficiary of a personal trust is usually identified, either 
by name or by some classification, such as family relation—that is, “to my grandchildren.” In a 
private trust, the individuals who benefit do so indirectly as a result of carrying out the larger 
purpose. Although a concrete rule is difficult to state, it appears that the best formulation 
focuses on the “end” (“finalité”) of the trust: “Does the beneficiary ‘only benefit from the trust 
through a realization of the trust purpose’ (in which case the trust is private), or does the 
beneficiary ‘himself represent the trust purpose’ (in which case it is personal)?”68
b. Comparison with Common Law Non-Charitable Purpose Trusts
The civil law’s private non-commercial trust includes categories of trusts that the common 
law would regard as invalid. The common law does not, for the most part, permit non-char-
itable purpose trusts. The most frequently cited reason for this rule is that “a purpose cannot 
enforce a trust.” In the absence of a specified beneficiary, there is no one “in whose favour the 
court can decree performance.”69 Exceptions have been made for the “anomalous trust,” such 
as a trust to care for animals or to provide for grave markers.70
Of course, at common law, a non-charitable trust whose objects cannot be determined 
with certainty remains invalid. Thus in Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts Lady Astor’s stated desire 
to encourage and maintain “good understanding, sympathy and co-operation” of the “English 
speaking nations” fails both because its purposes cannot be ascertained with certainty and 
because there is no beneficiary who might enforce it.71 The same seems to hold true for private 
non-commercial trusts in Quebec to the extent that they fail to meet the two-pronged char-
acterization of art 1268. That is to say, although the CcQ recognizes non-charitable purpose 
trusts, it does have limitations on certainty similar to those of the common law. Thus, while art 
1268 provides a statutory basis for anomalous trusts, as well as Quistclose or Denley’s trusts, it 
does not countenance the establishment of non-charitable purpose trusts in general.
One final point is also worth noting. The traditional objection to non-charitable purpose 
trusts stemming from the lack of a beneficiary is obviated by several provisions of the CcQ. 
Article 1287 provides that administration of the trust is “subject to the supervision of the settlor 
or of his heirs, if he has died, and of the beneficiary, even a future beneficiary.” In addition, art 
1290 authorizes the settlor, beneficiary, or “any other interested person” to take action against 
the trustee to “compel him to perform his obligations or to perform any act which is neces-
sary in the interest of the trust, to enjoin him to abstain from any action harmful to the trust 
or to have him removed.” Further, art 1291 authorizes a court to allow the settlor, beneficiary, 
or any other interested person to take legal action in place of the trustee. These provisions 
go a long way toward overcoming the beneficiary problem of non-charitable purpose trusts 
68 Michael Lubetsky, “Categorically Different: Unintended Consequences of Trust Taxonomy” in Lionel 
Smith, ed, The Worlds of the Trust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 340 at 347.
69 Morice v The Bishop of Durham (1804), 9 Ves 399 at 404, 32 ER 656; see also Re Astor’s Settlement 
Trusts, supra note 64. See also, generally, Chapter 5, Division One, “Non-charitable Purpose Trusts.”
70 See e.g. Re Dean (1889), 41 Ch D 552, 58 LJ Ch 693 (trust for the maintenance of stables and kennels 
of the testator’s horses and hounds); Re Hooper, [1932] 1 Ch 38, 101 LJ Ch 61 (trust for building and 
maintaining graves and funeral monuments); Re Thompson, [1934] Ch 342, 103 LJ Ch 162 (trust to 
promote fox hunting).
71 Re Astor’s Settlement Trusts, supra note 64.
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at common law, with the result that a wide range of people are given an incentive to monitor 
the trustee to ensure performance of his duties. Whether these provisions will become the 
source of intermeddling and unnecessary litigation is yet to be seen.
2. Onerous (Commercial) Trusts
The onerous, or commercial, trust is one of the most important innovations of the trust pro-
visions in the CcQ. It is the basis for the vast array of private investment trusts and pension 
funds that were long prohibited under the CCLC. Article 1269 sets forth the definition of the 
commercial trust:
1269. A trust constituted by onerous title for the purpose, in particular, of allowing the 
making of profit by means of investments, providing for retirement or procuring another 
benefit for the settlor or for the persons he designates or for the members of a partnership, 
company or association, or for employees or shareholders, is also a private trust.
The first thing to note is that the list of commercial trusts in art 1269 is not exhaustive. On 
the contrary, the list is intended to be descriptive of a range of possibilities, but is not meant 
to limit the uses to which commercial trusts may be put. The drafters of the CcQ clearly in-
tended that the commercial trust have as its primary object a profit-making purpose without 
specifying or limiting how those trusts may be utilized to accomplish that goal.
Two types of commercial trusts are contemplated. The first category includes trusts whose 
primary purpose is to make a profit. The second includes trusts designed to confer a financial 
benefit on determinate persons outside the family context. Examples of the first kind include 
investment trusts, mutual funds, real estate investment trusts, royalty trusts, and shareholder 
voting trusts. The second type include pension funds, profit-sharing funds, and certain RRSPs. 
As a result, the list of private commercial trusts can be endless.
3. Method of Creation
Private trusts may be formed by either gratuitous or onerous contract. The private non-com-
mercial purpose trust may be created either by a gratuitous or onerous contract, by will, or by 
notarial deed. However, the CcQ envisions a private commercial trust being formed primarily 
by onerous contract.
4. Duration
A significant aspect of the private trust is that it may be of perpetual duration.72 This is an 
important distinction from the common law, under which only charitable purpose trusts can 
be perpetual. This makes the use of a Quebec trust particularly advantageous, especially in 
commercial settings. Unlike Denley’s trusts, civil law non-charitable purpose trusts may be 
of indefinite duration, making them more useful for the social purposes they often seek to 
accomplish. Most significantly, art 1273 effectively eliminates the rule against perpetuities 
with regard to Quebec trusts. Although this might be a significant advantage in the realm of 
personal and private (non-charitable) trusts, its effect may be of limited value in commercial 
trusts because of the Income Tax Act “deemed disposition rule,” which requires perpetual 
commercial trusts to pay capital gains tax on trust property every 21 years.73
72 CcQ, art 1273.
73 Income Tax Act, RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp), ss 104(4)(b), (c). See also Chapter 2.
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C. SOCIAL TRUSTS
A social trust is “constituted for a purpose of general interest, such as a cultural, educational, 
philanthropic, religious, or scientific purpose.” It may not have the making of profit or the 
operation of an enterprise as its main object.74
The CcQ’s version of the social trust is superior to the charitable trust of the old CCLC, 
which limited such trusts to testamentary dispositions.75 generally, the social trust is a gratuit-
ous trust in that it provides benefits gratuitously to a class of beneficiaries, although it need 
not always be created by a gratuitous act. There are two types of social trusts: the charitable 
foundation and the general social trust.
1. The Charitable Foundation
A charitable foundation “results from an act whereby a person irrevocably appropriates the 
whole or part of his property to the durable fulfilment of a socially beneficial purpose.”76 The 
charitable foundation may be either an incorporated or unincorporated entity. The signifi-
cant difference between the charitable foundation and other types of charitable trusts is con-
tained in art 1259, which stipulates that “unless otherwise provided in the act constituting the 
foundation, the initial property of the trust foundation or any property … shall be preserved 
and allow for the fulfilment of the purpose, either by the distribution only of those revenues 
that derive therefrom or by a use that does not appreciably alter the substance of the initial 
property.” This means that the capital of the foundation is meant to be permanent. Only the 
income or revenue from the capital may be dispensed for the purposes of the foundation, 
although the settlor may alter this general rule in the instrument establishing the trust so that 
a foundation may be limited in duration.
2. Social Trusts in General
As noted above, private non-commercial purpose trusts may appear, in many respects, to 
have charitable or socially useful goals. The fundamental distinction between social trusts and 
private trusts is that the social trust must be one of general interest, distinct from purely private 
motives. Although it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between a private non-charitable 
purpose trust and a social trust, the primary difference appears to be that the social trust is 
characterized by the fact that it is devoted to a class of beneficiaries who, if not anonymous, 
are identified exclusively by the object of the trust. They are, in other words, innominate.77
Three points need to be mentioned. First, the word “purpose” is of great importance in 
ensuring that there is, in fact, a trust, and not merely a conditional gift. Second, the phrase 
“general interest” must be considered to ensure that whatever trust is created is considered a 
social, and not private or personal, trust. Third, the definition of charity in the CcQ seems to 
be rather broader than that applicable to common law trusts.
a. Intention
To begin with, the settlor must have as his purpose a desire to create a trust. It is not enough 
for a settlor merely to state an intention to achieve a particular aim. Instead, what is required 
is that the settlor clearly identify a class of beneficiaries distinct from any general purpose or 
74 CcQ, art 1270.
75 CCLC, art 869.
76 CcQ, art 1256.
77 Claxton, supra note 31 at 104.
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institution. Thus, as was the case with private trusts, the instrument must clearly evidence an 
intention to create a trust and not merely make a gift. For example, a grant that provides for 
the creation of a fund for the use of the Faculty of Law at the Université de Montréal would 
not be a social trust; however, a fund to provide scholarships for students studying law at the 
university would be. In both cases, the university might be called on to take possession of 
the money. In the first example, the fund is in the form of a restricted gift, which the university 
may use at its discretion to fund its law program. In the second example, the university is the 
trustee of a fund whose beneficiaries are certain innominate students.
b. Public Benefit
The second point is that the social trust must provide a benefit that is of general interest. 
The use of this phrase in art 1270 is clearly designed to distinguish social trusts from private 
or personal trusts. In the Commentaires du ministre, it is said that the term “general interest” 
was chosen as a synonym for “public interest.”78 The Code seems to have incorporated some 
form of the public-benefit test from common law to ensure that social trusts are not used to 
provide purely private benefits. The general-interest requirement for social trusts appears to 
serve the same function as the public-benefit test in common law charitable trusts—that is, 
both the common law and civil law trust must confer a public, rather than private, benefit.79 
Consequently, a trust established to provide scholarships for members of a decedent’s family 
would likely not pass the “public” aspect of the common law public-benefit test.80 The same 
would seem to hold true for the general-interest requirement of the social trust in Quebec.81
On the other hand, the common law requirement that there be an actual benefit to the 
public may be less onerous under the CcQ.82 This is because the use of the phrase “general 
interest” contained in the CcQ does not seem to require a “benefit,” but merely that the activ-
ities of the trust be of “interest” to the public. This has led some to suggest that Quebec law 
might allow for political charities in ways that the Canadian common law does not.83 Indeed, 
one commentator has asserted that “almost any interest considered worthy and of benefit to 
the community, even in an extremely indirect way, will qualify as a general interest” because a 
“general interest need not be one shared by the entire community.”84
c. What Is Charity?
The primary aim of a social trust is “for a purpose of general interest” (un but d’ intérêt 
général).85 This phrase seems hopelessly vague to those attuned to the common law de-
bate over the proper scope of the four heads of charity. This description is supplemented 
78 Commentaires du ministre, supra note 67 at 756.
79 See e.g. Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Trust Co Ltd, [1951] AC 297, [1951] 1 All ER 31 (HL).
80 See Re Compton, [1945] Ch 123, [1945] 1 All ER 198 (CA).
81 See e.g. Claxton, supra note 31 at 98; Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 348.
82 See e.g. Gilmour v Coats, [1949] AC 426, [1949] 1 All ER 848 (HL); Re Pinion Westminster Bank Ltd v 
Pinion, [1965] Ch 85, [1964] 1 All ER 890 (CA).
83 See e.g. McGovern v Attorney-General, [1982] Ch 321, [1981] 3 All ER 493; Human Life International 
in Canada Inc v MNR, [1998] FCJ No 365 (QL), [1998] 3 FC 202 (FCA). There has been a movement 
away from the political purposes doctrine in some common law jurisdictions: see e.g. Re Greenpeace 
of New Zealand Incorporation, [2014] NZSC 105; and Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation, [2010] 
HCA 42, (2010) 241 CLR 539.
84 Claxton, supra note 31 at 104-5.
85 CcQ, art 1270.
24  CHAPTER 17 TRUSTS IN QUEBEC
by the statement that a general purpose may be defined as “a cultural, educational, philan-
thropic, religious or scientific purpose.”86 This description replaces the wording in the CCLC 
that permitted trusts for “charitable or other lawful purposes within the limits permitted by 
law.”87 This older phrasing seems to have been intended to ensure that the Quebec trust was 
consistent with traditional common law concepts of charity. The newer definition of CcQ 
art 1270 appears to reject the limited common law view and anticipates a broader concept 
of charity than is currently the rule in the common law. This conclusion is supported by the 
qualifiers in art 1270, which list types of things that might be considered in the public interest. 
Thus while educational and religious trusts are well known to the common law, the statement 
that a social trust may be for any “philanthropic” purpose seems to open the door to a wider 
range of trusts than even the “other purposes beneficial to the community” standard of the 
common law.
As a result, it appears that the social trust differs significantly from the common law 
charitable purpose trust in terms of what each considers charity. The broader scope of 
philanthropy seems to make much of the common law jurisprudence on the definition of 
“charity” inapplicable to social trusts. Thus it has been suggested that a political charity might 
qualify as a social trust under Quebec law because such a trust would more easily satisfy a 
“general-interest” test than a “public-benefit” test.88 Similarly, the refusal of most common law 
courts to bring recreational or sporting activities within the ambit of charity, as seen in AYSA 
Amateur Youth Soccer Association v Canada (Revenue Agency),89 might not apply in Quebec, 
where the broader concept of “general interest” might well be seen to encompass trusts es-
tablished to benefit youth hockey leagues or other socially desirable purposes.
3. Formation
A charitable foundation is established by a gratuitous act either by inter vivos gift or by will.90 
A general-purpose social trust may be established either gratuitously or by onerous contract. 
The act establishing the social trust need not be gratuitous because it may involve a contract 
with a trust company to manage a social trust for a fee. Put another way, the act establishing 
the trust may be onerous even though the trust itself is gratuitous.
4. Duration
Although both charitable foundations and social trusts in general may be established in 
perpetuity, the evidence so far indicates that most foundations are not destined to last in-
definitely. This is especially true in the case of the unincorporated foundation.
5. Taxation
Charitable trusts enjoy important advantages under Canadian tax law, the most important of 
which is a complete exemption from income tax under s 149(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act. In 
86 Ibid.
87 CCLC, art 869.
88 Lubetsky, supra note 68 at 348. Arguably, the traditional limits on political activity by charities have 
been abrogated by the Ontario Superior Court’s decision in Canada Without Poverty v Attorney Gen-
eral Canada, [2018] ONSC 4147, 142 OR (3d) 754 and the revisions to the Canada Revenue Agency 
rules imposed by the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No 2, SC 2018, c 27.
89 2007 SCC 42, [2007] 3 SCR 217, 287 DLR (4th) 4.
90 CcQ, art 1258.
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order to obtain this benefit a trust must demonstrate that it meets the definition of “charity” as 
set forth in s 149.1 of that Act.
Traditionally, in applying these provisions, the Canada Revenue Agency has relied on com-
mon law precedents relating to the definition of “charity.”91 However, some commentators 
have advanced the position that the common law rules should not be binding on social trusts 
in Quebec. The basis for this argument is found in the Interpretation Act:92
8.1 Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and recognized 
sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and, unless otherwise provided by 
law, if in interpreting an enactment it is necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles 
or concepts forming part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made 
to the rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the enactment is 
being applied.
Section 8.2 of the Interpretation Act provides that when a statute “contains both civil law 
and common law terminology, or terminology that has a different meaning in the civil law and 
the common law, the civil law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the Province of 
Quebec and the common law terminology or meaning is to be adopted in the other provinces.”
Taking these two sections together, it is asserted that it is improper to apply common law 
jurisprudence on the definition of “charity” to the social trust. This is because the CcQ con-
tains different terminology than that used in the common law and because the understanding 
of the term “charity” is intended to be broader in Quebec. Proponents of this view argue that 
there is nothing in the current text of the Income Tax Act that requires the use of common 
law case law. The Act does not specifically “provide by law” that the common law definition 
must be used. If proponents of this view are correct, some Quebec social trusts would enjoy 
tax benefits that would be denied to similar common law trusts. Thus far, however, neither 
the Canada Revenue Agency nor the federal courts have adopted this position.
D. NO RESULTING OR CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
The 1994 CcQ does not have any provision for either constructive or resulting trusts. Article 
1262 of the CcQ provides that trusts may be created “by law” or “established by judgment.” 
However, as noted above, it seems clear that this phrase primarily refers to statutory trusts, 
and not constructive or resulting trusts. That part of the article permitting trusts to be “es-
tablished by judgment” appears dependent on previous “authorization by law” and applies 
only to give courts the power to create a trust where specifically provided by another article 
of the CcQ.93 Consequently, it is almost universally agreed that there is no place in Quebec 
law for constructive or resulting trusts in the absence of a specific legislative authorization.94 
At the same time, there is some confusion about the existence of an “implied trust.” To the 
extent that this phrase is understood as allowing a judge to establish a trust as a remedy in 
the absence of a settlor’s intention to do so, the concept has “no relevance” in Quebec law. 
This is because “[t]he intention of a settlor to transfer property to a patrimony by appropria-
tion is essential to the constitution of a trust.”95 However, Quebec courts have used the term 
“implied trust” in cases where the existence of a trust is based on an inference of the parties’ 
91 See e.g. Vancouver Society of Immigrant and Visible Minority Women v MNR, [1999] 1 SCR 10, [1999] 
SCJ No 5 (QL).
92 RSC 1985, c I-21, s 8.1
93 Groupe Sutton-Royal Inc (Syndic de), 2015 QCCA 1069 at para 90.
94 White Birch Paper Holding Company (Arrangement relatif à), 2012 QCCS 1679, [2012] RJQ 1063 at 
paras 185-92 (QCCS).
95 Groupe Sutton-Royal inc (Syndic de), supra note 93 at para. 91.
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intention to create one. Implied trusts are, in effect, de facto trusts. Consequently, as long as 
the requirements for the establishment of a trust set forth in CcQ arts 1260 et seq. are satis-
fied, the fact that the parties did not use express terminology of the trust in their dealings is 
not, in itself, an impediment to the constitution of a trust.96 The key consideration is whether 
the settlor’s intention to do so and the trustee’s intention to accept are clearly shown as a 
matter of evidence.97 The result is that the vast majority of trusts in Quebec are express trusts, 
with a very few trusts created by statute or judgment authorized by statute.
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VI. ADMINISTRATION, MODIFICATION, AND 
TERMINATION OF TRUSTS
In discussing the management of the Quebec trust, it is important to remember that the 
sources of the applicable rules differ from those of the common law. Bear in mind that the 
solution to the existential problem of trusts in Quebec was solved by two theoretical innova-
tions. First, the existence of the trust itself was given its doctrinal foundation in the recognition 
of a new patrimony: the patrimony by appropriation. This new patrimony allowed the civil law 
to avoid the theoretically insurmountable obstacles posed by the common law dichotomy of 
legal and equitable ownership. Once formed, however, civil law theory denied that the trustee 
could have any real rights in the property that was the subject of the trust. Indeed, the civil 
law continues to deny that the trustee is the legal owner of the property. On what basis, then, 
could the trustee act upon the res? The answer was found in the second innovation, which is 
that the trustee’s powers are derived from Title Seven of Book Four of the CcQ. This title sets 
forth the rules for those who deal with the property of others and encompasses arts 1299-
1370. These provisions are something of an innovation as compared with the common law, 
in that the common law rules for the management of property may differ depending on one’s 
relationship to the property, such as whether one is, for example, a trustee, executor, agent, 
or bailee. The rules of Title Seven apply to anyone who holds property owned by another. As 
a result, all administrators of the property of another, whatever their function or relationship 
to the property, have the same duties and obligations, subject only to whether their adminis-
tration is “simple” or “full,” as discussed below.98 The Quebec trust therefore exists by virtue of 
the combination of the theory of the patrimony by appropriation and the rules for administra-
tion of the property of others.
Although Title Seven applies to all administrators of property, the responsibilities of an ad-
ministrator will differ depending on whether the administration is “simple” (simple) or “full” 
(plein). For example, the guardian (tutor) of a minor has only simple administration of the 
minor’s property, which requires the guardian to preserve property for the minor’s benefit. A 
trustee, on the other hand, has full administration and is charged not only with its preserva-
tion but also with the obligation to increase it and make it productive. In general, the guard-
ian of minor children or an executor of an estate (“testamentary liquidator”) is charged with 
simple administration, while a trustee and a liquidator of a bankrupt corporation are given full 
administration.
The chief characteristic of simple administration involves ensuring the preservation of the 
patrimony for a reasonable period of time. In addition, the simple administrator has limited 
powers of management, and may have to obtain a court order or the consent of the bene-
ficiary to alienate property or subject it to a lien or mortgage, unless the property is in danger 
of deteriorating or depreciating before such authorization may be obtained. Finally, a simple 
administrator is limited to investing the property in a list of “presumed sound investments,” 
such as bank deposits, certificates of deposit, or certain securities.99
Those charged with full administration—for example, trustees—have wider powers and 
greater responsibilities. Thus, although the trustee has an obligation to do more with the cap-
ital than a simple administrator, he also has nearly unlimited powers of management, includ-
ing the right to alienate property without prior authorization from any party. Moreover, while 
a trustee is not permitted to alienate property gratuitously, neither is he limited to a list of 
“presumed sound investments.”100
98 CcQ, art 1299.
99 CcQ, arts 1301-1305.
100 CcQ, arts 1306-1307.
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A. THE RIGHTS AND ROLES OF THE PARTIES
Like the common law trust, the Quebec trust is characterized by a tripartite relationship 
between a settlor, trustee, and beneficiary. However, as might be expected, the theoretical 
foundations of the civil law trust mean that the role and rights of the parties frequently differ 
from those at common law.
1. The Settlor
The settlor’s role in the Quebec trust has been described as “paradoxical,” in that “as soon as 
he has ‘given life’ to the trust, the Civil Code essentially disregards him.”101 This is because, 
once the settlor has created the trust, he has very little role to play in its administration. One 
commentator describes the result as follows: “In principle, once the trust is created, it es-
capes from its creator, and of necessity, from his heirs.”102
As with the common law, to establish a Quebec trust, a settlor must have full legal cap-
acity to perform the juridical act that creates it. Essentially, this means the settlor must have 
the power to transfer the property that is to constitute the trust to the patrimony. Once this is 
done, the settlor’s role is largely a passive one. The property ceases to be part of the settlor’s 
patrimony and comes under the exclusive control of the trustee.103 In this regard, the settlor’s 
relationship to the property has been described as akin to that of a seller after a sale. Upon the 
act transferring the title, the settlor’s relationship to the corpus has ended, and he no longer 
has any direct connection to the property.
However, this statement expresses the default rule. If the settlor establishes a trust without 
reserving any continuing role to himself, the trustee will take control of the property and 
administer it without regard to the settlor’s existence or desires. In many cases, however, the 
settlor is not completely out of the picture. As with any sale, the terms of the contract may 
stipulate how property may be used, who may use it, or what happens when certain condi-
tions are, or are not, met. The same holds true with respect to the trust. The CcQ permits a 
settlor to reserve a number of continuing rights or roles. In general, they are of five kinds:
 1. The settlor need not transfer the entire bundle of rights in a certain property to the 
trust patrimony. Instead, he may reserve some property rights, such as the right to use 
part of the property or the income from certain rents or revenues. In such a case, the 
trustee takes control of only those rights that are transferred, while the reserved rights 
continue in the settlor.104
 2. The settlor may also name himself as a beneficiary. This differs from a reservation of 
rights in that the whole of the property is transferred to the trust patrimony, and thus 
the whole of the property comes under the control of the trustee. The settlor receives 
benefits from the trust as a result of the trustee performing his duties.105
 3. The settlor may name himself co-trustee; however, the settlor can never be the sole 
trustee. Article 1275 provides that there must always be a trustee who is neither a set-
tlor nor beneficiary in order for there to be a validly constituted trust.
101 Beaulne, supra note 12 at 208.
102 John EC Brierley, “De certains patrimoines d’affectation: Les article 1256-1298” in La réforme du 
Code civil: Textes réunis par le Barreaus du Québec et la Chambre des notaires du Québec (Sainte-
Foy, Que: Presses de l’Université Laval, 1993) 735 at 771 (“En principe, un fois la fiducie créé, elle 
échappe à son créateur et, a fortiori, à ses héritiers”).
103 CcQ, art 1265.
104 CcQ, art 1281.
105 Ibid.
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 4. In some unusual cases, a trust instrument may provide that the settlor be employed 
by the trust in some capacity—for example, as a consultant, a mandatary, a lessee, or 
an employee.
 5. Finally, a settlor may reserve other rights or roles—for example, the right to name 
beneficiaries,106 the right to make additions to the trust patrimony,107 and the right to 
name successor trustees.108
Without doubt, however, one of the most important rights is the settlor’s power to super-
vise the administration of the trust. Article 1287 provides that “the administration of a trust is 
subject to the supervision of the settlor or of his heirs, if he has died, and of the beneficiary, 
even a future beneficiary.” In English, the word “supervision” normally indicates a power to 
direct, but that is not the sense in which the CcQ uses the term. The French version of the 
Code makes this clear in its use of the word “surveillance.” Otherwise, permitting a settlor 
to supervise a trustee would be inconsistent with the independent nature of the patrimony 
by appropriation as well as the principle that the trustee has control of the trust property. 
Instead, it appears that the intent of art 1287 of the Code is to give the settlor and the bene-
ficiaries the right to consult with the trustee with respect to the administration of the trust. 
In cases where there is disagreement about the trustee’s fidelity to the terms of the trust, art 
1290 creates a specific cause of action empowering a settlor, beneficiary, or “other interested 
person” to compel compliance by the trustee:
1290. The settlor, the beneficiary or any other interested person may, notwithstanding 
any stipulation to the contrary, take action against the trustee to compel him to perform his 
obligations or to perform any act which is necessary in the interest of the trust, to enjoin 
him to abstain from any action harmful to the trust or to have him removed.
He may also impugn any acts performed by the trustee in fraud of the trust patrimony or 
the rights of the beneficiary.
2. The Trustee
The CcQ provides that a trustee must be a “natural person having full exercise of his civil 
rights” or a “legal person authorized by law.”109 In addition, a fully emancipated minor would 
also be qualified.110 The obvious purpose of these restrictions is to ensure that the trustee has 
the legal capacity to deal with the property that is the subject of the trust. In the case of a cor-
poration, the Code implies that only a company licensed to act as a Quebec trust company is 
qualified to be a trustee.111
a. Powers
As noted above in Section IV.D, the trustee is essential to the Quebec trust. The trust is only 
“constituted” or given its legal existence upon acceptance by the trustee. Until that happens, 
there is no trust. However, upon acceptance, the trustee is vested with full powers of admin-
istration and management of the trust patrimony. He alone is responsible for implementing 
106 CcQ, art 1280.
107 CcQ, art 1293.
108 CcQ, art 1276.
109 CcQ, art 1274.
110 CcQ, art 176.
111 See An Act Respecting Trust Companies and Savings Companies, CQLR c S-29.01.
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the terms of the trust because the trustee alone is vested with control over the property. 
Absent the reservation of rights or roles in the settlor, as discussed above, the trustee has 
the sole power to make decisions concerning the management of the property, investments, 
and disbursements.
Having full powers of administration, the trustee is required not only to preserve the capital 
but also to take steps to increase its value and make it productive. The trustee also has broad 
powers to dispose of the trust property, and is not required to seek approval from either a 
court or other parties. The only exception to this rule is that the trustee may not alienate 
property gratuitously, unless the distribution is of limited value and is done for the benefit of 
the beneficiary or is otherwise in the interests of the trust. In addition, a trustee may encum-
ber the trust property or subject it to a security interest as long as there is a fair exchange 
of value. Finally, a trustee is free to make any investment that is reasonable under the cir-
cumstances and consistent with a trustee’s duty to use reasonable care in the management 
of property of another. This rule is significant in that the trustee is not subject to the rules 
applicable to “presumed sound investments” required of other administrators of property. The 
CcQ contains a list of “presumed sound investments” akin to the “legal list” of some common 
law jurisdictions.112 This list is obligatory for administrators of property who have only simple 
administration—for example, a conservator of a minor’s property. Those with powers of full 
administration—for example, a trustee—are not bound by the list unless the settlor specifically 
provides otherwise in the instrument establishing the trust.
b. Duties
The trustee is obligated to act in the best interests of the beneficiary consistent with the terms 
of the trust instrument. The specific duties are set out in Title Seven’s rules for administrators 
of the property of others and apply to all persons who have control over someone else’s 
property. In the trust context, many of the duties described in the CcQ have their analogue in 
common law fiduciary duties.
i. Act in Accordance with the Trust Terms
The trustee’s first duty, of course, is to act in accordance with the terms of the trust instrument:
1308. The administrator of the property of others shall, in carrying out his duties, com-
ply with the obligations imposed on him by law or by the constituting act. He shall act 
within the powers conferred on him.
Failure to comply with the terms of the trust provisions will make the trustee liable to an 
action by the settlor or beneficiary in accordance with the provisions of art 1290.
ii. Prudence
Second, the trustee is obligated to act with prudence and diligence.113 The terms of this obli-
gation obviously differ depending on the purpose of the trust, the nature of the property 
that forms the corpus, and the experience of the trustee. This latter factor seems to make 
the trustee’s obligations dependent on the experience or professional qualifications of the 
trustee, with the result that a trust company or other professional might be held to a higher 
standard than someone lacking experience or professional qualifications. One commentator 
has phrased the duty this way:
112 CcQ, art 1339.
113 CcQ, art 1309.
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Assessment of an administrator’s conduct and decisions must be in accordance with an ob-
jective standard, that of the reasonable person administering another’s property and placed 
in the same circumstances. If the administrator also has special skills in the management of 
another’s property or assets, the standard of reference will be that of a professional man-
ager of another’s property.114
This differential standard would seem to conflict, at least on its face, with the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Fales v Canada Permanent Trust Co.115
iii. Loyalty
The Quebec trustee also owes the beneficiaries a duty of loyalty. Article 1309 states that the 
trustee must act “honestly and faithfully in the best interest of the beneficiary or of the object 
pursued.” The requirement of “faithfulness” means that the trustee should act exclusively in 
the interests of the beneficiary and put aside his own or anyone else’s interests:
1310. No administrator may exercise his powers in his own interest or that of a third 
person or place himself in a position where his personal interest is in conflict with his obli-
gations as administrator.
If the administrator himself is a beneficiary, he shall exercise his powers in the common 
interest, giving the same consideration to his own interest as to that of the other beneficiaries.
The duty of loyalty may not be avoided by an exculpatory clause. Thus, in Després c 
Théberge,116 the trustees were held liable for loss when they invested trust funds in a business 
of which they were primary shareholders and that eventually went bankrupt. The Court held 
that the fact that the will establishing the trust contained a clause giving the trustees com-
plete discretion in making investments, as well as an exculpatory clause, did not relieve them 
from the obligation to conduct themselves as a “bon père de famille.”117
Included within the duty of loyalty is the obligation to refrain from using trust property or 
information obtained during the course of administration of the trust for personal gain. In 
addition, a trustee has a duty to notify the beneficiary of a business interest that might place 
him in a position of conflict with respect to the trust as well as any right the trustee might 
have that could be exercised contrary to the trust or the beneficiary’s interest.118
iv. Impartiality
The trustee also has a duty of impartiality with respect to different beneficiaries as well as 
different classes of beneficiaries:
1317. If there are several beneficiaries of the administration, concurrently or succes-
sively, the administrator is bound to act impartially in their regard, taking account of their 
respective rights.
The duty imposed by the CcQ is largely akin to that at common law, which states that a 
trustee must maintain “an even hand” between different classes of beneficiaries.119 As a result, 
114 Lise I Beaudoin, “Les conventions relatives à l’administration du bien d’autrui” in Denys-Claude La-
montagne, ed, Droit spécialisé des contrats: Les contrats rélatifs à l’entreprise, vol 3 (Cowansville, 
Que: Yvon Blais, 2001) 317 at para 44.
115 [1977] 2 SCR 302, [1976] SCJ No 72 (QL).
116 [1998] JQ no 5003 (QL), REJB 1998-05733 (Sup Ct).
117 Ibid at para 32, citing CCLC, art 981k.
118 CcQ, art 1311; see also Alcar Holdings Inc c Naimer, [2000] JQ No 3307 (QL), REJB 2000-20406 (CA).
119 See e.g. Re Smith (1971), 16 DLR (3d) 130, [1971] 1 OR 584 (H Ct), aff’d (1971), 18 DLR (3d) 405, [1971] 
2 OR 541 (CA).
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the trustee must treat all beneficiaries in the same class fairly. He must also be impartial as 
between the interests of successive classes.120 However, there is nothing in the law that pre-
vents a settlor from specifically providing for unequal treatment.121 In addition, some have 
suggested that the more detailed provisions of the CcQ make some of the common law 
jurisprudence with respect to impartiality inapplicable.122
v. Delegation
The Quebec trustee arguably has greater powers to delegate than the common law trustee:
1337. An administrator may delegate his duties or be represented by a third person for 
specific acts; however, he may not delegate generally the conduct of the administration or 
the exercise of a discretionary power, except to his co-administrators.
He is accountable for the person selected by him if, among other things, he was not 
authorized to make the selection. If he was so authorized, he is accountable only for the 
care with which he selected the person and gave him instructions.
This provision is consistent with the common law rule that a trustee may not delegate dis-
cretionary functions. He may employ agents to perform certain managerial functions and is 
not liable for their misconduct provided that he used due care in their selection. A beneficiary 
who is injured by the acts of a delegate may “repudiate” the actions of the delegate “if they 
were done contrary to the constituting act or to usage.” A beneficiary may also have an action 
directly against the mandatary for negligent or wrongful acts, “even where the administrator 
was duly empowered to give the mandate.”123
vi. Removal
A trustee is subject to removal (destitution) in two ways. The first is by order of the court, 
and the second is where a provision of the trust instrument specifically provides for it. The 
latter method is frequently utilized in commercial trusts, where the contract establishing the 
trust, such as a mutual fund or other investment trust, might provide for the removal of a fund 
manager by the settlor or the beneficiaries, acting individually or in concert with each other. 
Removal by a court order occurs upon a motion by the settlor, the beneficiary, or “any 
other in terested person.”124
The CcQ does not set forth the specific reasons for which a trustee may be replaced. 
However, the Quebec Court of Appeal has said the following:
[TRANSLATION] In short, the reasons for the removal of a trustee—as for a liquidator—must 
be serious, and not merely theoretical, but actually affect the responsibilities of the execu-
tor or the trustee in the sense that there will be harm to the interests of the estate.125
Article 791 of the CcQ lists reasons for removing the executor of an estate, and these 
have frequently been assumed to apply to a trustee as well. These include situations where 
the trustee is “unable to assume the responsibilities of his office,” “neglects his duties,” or 
120 Association provinciale des retraités d’Hydro-Québec c Hydro-Québec, 2005 QCCA 304, [2005] 
RJQ 927.
121 St-Louis (liquidatrice de) c St-Louis, [1997] JQ no 423 (QL), [1997] RJQ 1099 (Sup Ct).
122 Beaulne, supra note 12 at 216 (suggesting that the CcQ’s provisions on investments would provide 
greater leeway to a trustee to treat income and capital beneficiaries differently).
123 CcQ, art 1338.
124 CcQ, art 1290.
125 Brodie (Succession) c Cie Trust Royal, 25 QAC 22, [1989] JQ No 1082 (QL) at para 7 (QAC).
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“does not fulfil his obligations.” Over the years, therefore, Quebec courts have ordered the 
removal of a trustee in a variety of circumstances, including loaning funds without interest 
where there was a conflict of interest,126 failure to produce accounts and a refusal to act 
with diligence,127 failure to sell property at fair market value and to effect partition in a timely 
manner,128 and investing money in a private company whose shareholders were the trustees 
themselves.129 At the same time, courts have rejected claims for removal where the complaint 
was merely that the trustees could not agree on a course of action,130 where there was a lack 
of transparency in the absence of malice,131 and where the fees of the corporate trustee were 
alleged to be too high.132
Once a trustee is removed, a court may appoint a replacement in the absence of any pro-
vision in the trust providing for another mechanism.133
3. The Beneficiary
The CcQ does not confine the use of the term “beneficiary” to a natural or legal person. 
Instead, a beneficiary may be a person or a purpose. In addition, the beneficiary may be de-
termined, determinable, or abstract. In effect, a beneficiary may be determined in three ways:
 1. the beneficiary may directly by the instrument establishing the trust—that is, specific-
ally named in the constituting act;
 2. the beneficiary may determinable by some formula or clause that permits the settlor, 
trustee, or some third party to designate beneficiaries;134 or
 3. the beneficiary may be an abstract cause or purpose, as in a private non-commercial 
or social trust.
a. Who May Be a Beneficiary?
In the case of a gratuitous trust, the CcQ provides that “[o]nly a person having the qualities 
to receive by gift or by will at the time his right opens may be the beneficiary of a trust con-
stituted gratuitously.”135 In the case of a private commercial trust, the beneficiaries will be 
those set forth in the contract establishing the trust. No matter the situation, however, the 
beneficiary of a trust must meet all the conditions required by the constituting act in order 
to receive.136
The beneficiary is not typically a party to the trust, although he might be in some cases—for 
example, in a mutual fund or other investment trust. Moreover, the beneficiary is not required 
to accept the benefit for the trust to be constituted. Instead, as noted above, the trust comes 
126 See Leclerc c Leclerc, [1975] CA 792.
127 Fondation des maladies du coeur du Québec c Morency succession, [1996] JQ No 985 (QL), JE 96-
1095 (Sup Ct).
128 Vetter c Vetter Estate, [1995] JQ No 1911 (QL), No 500-05-005418-940 (Sup Ct).
129 Després c Théberge, supra note 116.
130 Côté (Succession de), [1999] JQ No 4386 (QL), JE 99-1875 (CA).
131 Marchand c Vaillancourt, [1999] JQ No 1887 (QL), REJB 1999-13026 (Sup Ct).
132 Marmet (Succession de), [1999] JQ No 511 (QL), JE 99-625 (Sup Ct).
133 CcQ, art 1277.
134 CcQ, art 1282.
135 CcQ, art 1279.
136 CcQ, art 1280.
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into force upon acceptance by the trustee of the office, regardless of whether the beneficiaries 
have been determined. Finally, in the case of a gratuitous trust, the beneficiaries are assumed 
to accept the benefit unless they explicitly reject it.137 If a beneficiary rejects the benefits of the 
trust, they will pass to the next class. If no beneficiaries are left to take, the assets will be dis-
tributed to the capital beneficiary in accordance with the terms of the instrument.138
b. Rights of the Beneficiary
Article 1284 of the CcQ declares that a beneficiary has “the right to require either the provi-
sion of a benefit granted to him, or the payment of the fruits and revenues and of the capital 
or the payment of one or the other.” This provision essentially means that the beneficiary 
is entitled to demand whatever rights are given him by the terms of the trust instrument. 
In some cases, this will mean payment of a sum of money, as either an income or a capital 
beneficiary, or the use of some service or facility, such as where a private non-commercial 
trust provides for the maintenance of a sports ground.
Article 1261 provides that the trust patrimony is “autonomous and distinct from that of the 
settlor, trustee or beneficiary.” As a result, the beneficiary’s right is personal, rather than real, 
or in rem. This is a significant departure from the common law theory that recognizes the 
beneficiary as having a form of equitable ownership right in the trust property. Consequently, 
the beneficiary lacks rights that exist at common law against the property, such as the right to 
trace and claim property wrongfully transferred, or the right to obtain an equitable lien. And 
because Quebec law does not recognize the existence of the constructive trust, the benefici-
ary has no remedy in that direction either. The result is that the beneficiaries of civil law trusts 
have much weaker protections than those of common law trusts.
Some have suggested that the relationship between beneficiary and trust is one of debtor 
and creditor. This cannot be correct, however, because the trust is not a person, and thus no 
rights can exist against it in personam. Nor is the beneficiary a creditor of the trustee, because 
the trust patrimony exists independently of the trustee. Moreover, the CcQ makes it clear that 
the trustee’s obligations are to the patrimony and not to any particular party. On its face, there-
fore, the beneficiary of the Quebec trust has no rights against either the trust or the trustee 
under the normal principles of civil law obligations. In order to remedy this, the drafters of the 
CcQ provided for a series of specific statutory actions in favour of the beneficiary against the 
trustee that largely mimic traditional debtor – creditor claims, but exist independently of the 
Code’s section on obligations. These include the right to commence an action to require the 
trustee to pay or provide a benefit.139 In addition, the beneficiary may commence an action to 
compel the trustee to perform an obligation or to refrain from taking an action.140 A court may 
also permit the settlor or a beneficiary to take “legal action” in the place of the trustee when, 
without sufficient reason, he fails to do so.141 Finally, like the settlor, the beneficiary has the 
right to “supervise” the actions of the trustee to ensure that the terms of the trust are faithfully 
executed, and to move to have the trustee removed for malfeasance or nonfeasance.142
137 CcQ, art 1285.
138 CcQ, art 1286.
139 CcQ, art 1284.
140 CcQ, art 1290.
141 CcQ, art 1291.
142 CcQ, arts 1287, 1290.
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B. MODIFICATION AND AMENDMENT
The Quebec trust exists by virtue of its being a “patrimony by appropriation” that is “autono-
mous and distinct from that of the settlor, trustee or beneficiary and in which none of them 
has any real right.”143 This theory means that once the trust is established, it is designed to 
function independently of the settlor who created it and the beneficiaries who receive its 
benefits. One commentator compares the Quebec trust to a kite put aloft by a settlor, who 
then gives over the strings to the trustee. The settlor has set the course of the flight, but he 
cannot control the strings. The trustee holds the string, but is limited in the manner and dir-
ection in which it flies. For their part, the beneficiaries are largely spectators watching the kite 
in motion but powerless to affect its travels.144
This rather fanciful image is designed to make one thing clear—the fact of its autonomy 
makes modification of the Quebec trust theoretically difficult. This theoretical difficulty is 
compounded by the fact that the CcQ contains no article specifically providing for the modi-
fication of a trust. It is clear that neither the settlor nor the beneficiaries have any control over 
the trust. As a result, some have argued that the trustee, as the person with actual control 
over the patrimony, is the only entity (other than a court), that can modify or amend a trust. 
This silence of the Code has thus generated a great deal of controversy.
1. Modification and Amendment by the Trustee
At common law, the trustee is prevented from modifying or amending a trust in the absence of 
a clause specifically giving the trustee that power. In Quebec, the situation is unclear. A number 
of authors contend that the trustee cannot modify a trust even if the trust instrument contains 
a clause allowing him to do so. These commentators argue that art 1294 of the CcQ implicitly 
vests courts alone with the power to modify trusts and that this power is exclusive. Others as-
sert that a clause inserted in the trust instrument giving the trustee power to modify the trust 
would be valid.145 This latter position seems to have gained wider acceptance among members 
of the academic and legal community, although the courts have yet to rule on its validity.146
2. Termination, Modification, and Amendment by the Court
Article 1294 provides that a court may terminate a trust when the settlor’s intent can no 
longer be carried out because doing so would be either impossible or impracticable.
1294. Where a trust has ceased to meet the original intent of the settlor, particularly as 
a result of circumstances unknown to him or unforeseeable and which make the pursuit 
of the purpose of the trust impossible or too onerous, the court may, on the application of 
an interested person, terminate the trust; the court may also, in the case of a social trust, 
substitute another closely related purpose for the original purpose of the trust.
Where the trust continues to meet the intent of the settlor but new measures would 
allow a more faithful compliance with his intent or facilitate the fulfilment of the trust, the 
court may amend the provisions of the constituting act.
143 CcQ, art 1265.
144 Beaulne, supra note 12 at 220.
145 This debate is extensively reviewed in Jacques Beaulne, Droit des fiducies, 2nd ed (Montreal: Wilson 
& Lafleur, 2005).
146 Diane Bruneau, “La modification et la terminaison des fiducies par les tribunaux du Québec” (2003) 
105:2 R du N 409 at 435-36.
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The court’s power to terminate a trust is dependent on the purposes of the trust being 
“too onerous” to carry out. This generally means that it is either impossible or impracticable 
to carry out the trust’s original purpose. The cause of the impossibility is largely irrelevant. It 
does not matter whether the impossibility is created by the fact that that purpose has been 
fulfilled or that the settlor was mistaken as to the manner by which the object might have 
been pursued. Once the impossibility exists, any party may move to terminate the trust.
Note that art 1294 makes a distinction between social trusts and other trusts. The first part 
of the article makes clear that, although a court may terminate either kind of trust, only a 
social trust may be modified in a manner akin to the common law’s cy-près doctrine—that is, 
if the purpose of a personal or private trust becomes too onerous to pursue, then the trust is 
terminated. In the case of a social trust, the court may either terminate or “substitute another 
closely related purpose for the original purpose of the trust.” If the court cannot save the trust 
by substituting another “closely related purpose,” it will terminate the trust and direct that the 
patrimony be “devoted to a purpose as nearly like that of the trust as possible.” Before doing 
so, however, the court will seek the recommendation of the trustee and any agency author-
ized by law to supervise the trust.147
The power to substitute a purpose in the CcQ is similar to the equitable power of cy près. 
However, there are significant differences between the two, which caution against consid-
ering the two powers as equivalent. At common law, if a court concludes that it is impossible 
to carry out the terms of the trust, it may apply cy près to substitute a closely related purpose 
in order to comply with the settlor’s presumed general charitable intent. In addition, courts 
of equity have the power to “make a scheme”—that is, to amend or interpret provisions in a 
trust to avoid uncertainty or otherwise allow the settlor’s intent to be fulfilled. Under the CcQ, 
however, the court’s power is limited to substituting another purpose for the original one. 
Quebec courts do not have “scheme-making” power along the lines of those exercised by 
courts of equity.
A second important distinction concerns the timing of the impossibility. Equity courts have 
traditionally exercised the power of cy près in cases where the impossibility arose both before 
and after the trust was constituted. Quebec law seems not to permit substitution in cases 
where the purpose of the trust was impossible ab initio. Article 1294 states that the court’s 
power applies “[w]here a trust has ceased to meet the original intent of the settlor.” This lan-
guage indicates that the trust must have been both duly constituted and functioning before 
the impossibility or impracticability arose.
These two differences—the lack of a scheme-making power and the requirement that the 
impossibility arise after the establishment of the trust—make the power to modify a trust less 
extensive than is the case with common law trusts.
In any event, if the purpose of a trust—whether personal, private, or social—may still be 
carried out in accordance with the settlor’s purpose, then the court can order an amendment, 
providing “new measures” that would allow “a more faithful compliance with his intent.”148 
This power is similar to the power to vary trusts given to courts of equity. However, it may 
be exercised only with respect to the administration of the trust; it cannot be used to modify 
the purpose. Significantly, the CcQ permits a court to amend the trust provisions without the 
consent of the beneficiaries.
C. TERMINATION
A trust may be terminated for a variety of reasons. These include the fact that the purposes 
for which the trust was established have been met, or because it is no longer possible to 
147 CcQ, art 1298.
148 CcQ, art 1294.
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achieve the settlor’s intent. In addition, trusts may come to an end because their beneficiaries 
have renounced their interest, or the stipulated term has expired. Finally, there is some debate 
as to whether the beneficiaries may bring a trust to an end. These are all discussed below.
1. Expiry of the Term
A personal, private, or social trust may expire simply because it has reached the end of its 
stipulated term of life. Thus, a testamentary trust established to pay the widow of the settlor 
a stated income for her life, with a provision requiring payment of the capital to the settlor’s 
children upon her death, will terminate when the capital is disbursed. Similarly, a trust to es-
tablish a fund for the building of a new library will terminate when the library is built.149
2. Impossibility
As discussed above in Section VI.B.2, if a court finds that the settlor’s purposes cannot be 
achieved, it may terminate the trust.150 In the case of a social trust, the court may then apply 
the funds to another purpose closely related to the settlor’s original intent.151
3. Lapse of the Right of Beneficiaries
A trust may also terminate when the right of all the beneficiaries has lapsed. This might occur 
in two circumstances. The first would be where the trust has paid out all the benefits so that 
there are no more claims on its assets. The most likely scenario for this is when the trust has 
fulfilled it purposes. A second situation would be where the beneficiaries have renounced 
their rights.152
4. Termination by the Settlor, the Trustee, or the Beneficiaries
A trust cannot be terminated by the settlor alone. This is because the establishment of the 
trust creates an independent patrimony. Once the trustee has accepted the appointment, the 
settlor is divested of the property that forms the patrimony. He cannot, therefore, unilaterally 
revoke a trust. Moreover, a gratuitous trust cannot be revoked by the settlor.153 As a result, 
once the trust is established, the settlor has limited rights of supervision pursuant to art 1287, 
but there is no power given to the settlor to unilaterally revoke.
The trustee also appears to lack the power to terminate. Although the trustee has control 
over the patrimony, the trustee’s duty is to implement the settlor’s intent. In the first instance, 
then, a trustee cannot, on his own authority, bring an end to a trust. However, an interesting 
question arises as to whether he might do so where a clause in the trust instrument confers that 
power directly. Although the courts have not yet ruled specifically on this point, it seems that 
the requirement in art 1294 for court intervention would make any such unilateral power void.154
149 CcQ, art 1296.
150 CcQ, art 1294.
151 CcQ, art 1298.
152 CcQ, art 1296.
153 CcQ, art 1822.
154 See e.g. Fiducie Desjardins Inc c AP, [2004] JQ no 6690 (QL), EYB 2004-64957.
38  CHAPTER 17 TRUSTS IN QUEBEC
Finally, it has been suggested that the beneficiaries of a trust may bring about its early 
termination along the lines of the rule in Saunders v Vautier.155 However, the only case to have 
considered the question thus far has refused to incorporate the rule into Quebec law.156
VII. CONCLUSION
The Quebec trust is now a little more than 25 years old. There seems little doubt that the trust 
established by the CcQ (1994) is a dramatic improvement over the tentative and piecemeal 
approach of the old CCLC and the 1879 trusts act. The new Code provides a theoretical basis 
for the trust in the civil law context, as well as clearly setting forth the procedures by which 
trusts are established, administered, modified, and terminated.
One of the more interesting questions for the future is the extent to which Quebec jurists 
will rely on common law principles and precedents to guide their interpretation of the trust 
provisions of the CcQ. There is no doubt that the Quebec trust owes a great deal to its com-
mon law analogue. However, the need to firmly ground the Quebec version in the principles 
of the civil law will prevent the wholesale importation of common law rules in what is clearly 
a uniquely Quebec institution.
155 (1841), EWHC Ch J82, 41 ER 482 (Ch).
156 Alkallay c Bratt, REJB 2002-38861 at para 6, [2002] JQ No 6120 (QL) (Sup Ct).
